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Satire and definition1
Abstract: This paper explores some of the difficulties involved in defining satire.
Neither the formal characteristics of satire nor its informing purposes, in-
cluding its variable associations with humour and the provocation of amusement 
allow for a unifying definition over the long term. It considers a range of ap-
proaches to and types of definition and takes as a principle example the notion of 
Menippean satire. It argues that a characterisation in terms of family resemblance 
is more helpful for a strictly historical understanding than formal definitions and 
that it is misleading to take satire as a genre, let along a literary one. Throughout 
it also suggests that the case of satire tells us something about definition and the 
often naïve expectations of what definitions can establish.
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Plato’s early dialogue Euthyphro begins with Socrates going to the law courts to 
be tried for impiety and corrupting the youth of Athens. On his way he meets the 
young Euthyphro, also bound for court to accuse his father of killing a slave, who 
was thought to have committed murder. One travels to accuse, the other to be 
 accused: both are in search of justice. Euthyphro is confident he knows what it is, 
for he can provide examples; but how, asks Socrates, can he be sure unless he 
already has in mind a paradeigma, a pattern of virtue? This is what Socrates de-
mands, an abstract idea by which any matter can be defined and judged (Plato 
1969 [c. 380 BCE]: 2a–6d).2 Conversely, as Plato knew, the question is, how do you 
1 Part of this paper was first given at The Australasian Humour Studies Network Colloquium, 
The Women’s College, University of Sydney, February 13–14, 2010. My thanks are due to the 
discussants, but especially to Prof. Robert Phiddian and to Dr. Jessica Milner Davis who 
additionally read the whole and commented with constructive critical care. I am grateful also 
to the anonymous readers of Humor for their care and insight.
2 The date of Plato’s, Euthyphro, is uncertain, circa 390 BCE. Where pre-modern texts are cited 
I have included the dates of the first, or early edition on which I have relied, as well as the 
recent imprint or translation used.
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discover the paradeigma without first working from evidence of conduct? This 
was an early example of what has been called Meno’s paradox (Ibberson 1986: 
115–116). And although the theory of forms introduced in this Platonic dialogue 
was always about more than definition, that theory and that paradox still inform 
some understandings of what it means to define.
It set on its way the chicken-and-egg problem of priority between definiens 
(abstract definition) and definiendum (that which is defined), and established the 
expectation that a definition at once isolates an essence and provides an ideal-
ized form. Because the word logos in Greek could refer to word, noun or discourse, 
it may also have encouraged confusion over what definitions were of, perhaps of 
things (like tables and chairs) or figures (like triangles), rather than of words. It 
helped give an urgency and authority for the definitional as a supervening and 
legislative process. It certainly articulated a long lasting belief that definitions are 
important, that without them you can hardly get started. Students who routinely 
begin essays with a dictionary definition, and professors who advise them that 
first of all they must define their terms, are both the distant progeny of the doomed 
Socrates and the hapless Euthyphro.
All these expectations of definition, however, can be profoundly misleading 
when brought to the study of satire. What follows here is neither a catalogue of 
attempted definitions of satire, nor an exploration of the complexities of defini-
tional theory and formal logic. It concerns the difficulties attendant upon trying 
to examine satire historically. This is an emphasis to one side of, and largely 
at  odds with literary critics’ attempts to provide a definition for what, almost 
ubiquitously, has been accepted as a body, even a genre of literature, which to be 
understood requires we pay attention to the best of it, so bringing into alignment 
definition with supreme exemplification (Highet 1962: 3; see also Rosenheim 
1963: 3–34; Feinberg 1968: 31–7; Griffin 1994). Although this paper concerns histo-
riography, it was also partially stimulated by the need to provide working legal 
definitions to address problems raised by recent Australian legislation designed 
to protect satire and parody from some of the rigors of copyright law. A common 
point of departure for that earlier essay and this work is the problematic reliance 
on the dictionary and the belief that satire is to be defined fundamentally as a 
literary genre (Condren et al. 2008a, 2008b).3 But as the argument will cumula-
tively show, even if in some contexts of study, a definition of satire can be a neces-
sary beginning, for the historian, therein lies an initial problem.
Dictionaries can only do certain sorts of things well, and since lawyers go to 
them for records of common current usage, it is salutary to note that they are fre-
3 In dealing with dictionary definitions, I am indebted to my collaborators.
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quently at least a generation out of date, and predictably skewed by the patterns 
of illustration on which they rely. Until the nineteenth century, dictionaries were 
highly selective and usually legislative, concentrating on difficult or foreign 
words, or the argot of society’s sub-groups (for example Minsheu 1617; Kersey 
1702; Grose 1811). Although there was a progenitor in Bailey’s Universal etymo-
logical dictionary (1735), and more famously in Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary 
(1755), it was Noah Webster’s American dictionary of the English language (1828) 
and then the OED that ushered in a far more ambitious enterprise – that of provid-
ing lexical definitions of all (most) words in the language. It is inevitable, given 
the fluidity of language-use and the expansion of English in particular, that there 
will be a time-lag and that only certain sorts of utterance (for Johnson, those he 
took to be from the best authors) will be looked to for examples of what is defined 
(Condren et al. 2008a: 286–292). But lexical definitions of the sort dictionaries 
offer are themselves of limited value in dealing with the complex intellectual 
 phenomena that can develop through stipulative conceptualization.
So what sorts of definition are relevant to understanding satire, and what 
might satire illustrate about the process of definition? For initial orientation, here 
are the definitions from the OED. Satire:
1. A poem, or in modern use sometimes a prose composition, in which 
prevailing vices or follies are held up to ridicule. Sometimes, less correctly, 
applied to a composition in verse or prose intended to ridicule a particular 
person or class of persons, a lampoon.
 b.  transf. A satirical utterance; a speech or saying in ridicule of some person 
or thing. Obs.
 c.  fig. A thing, fact, or circumstance that has the effect of making some 
person or thing ridiculous.
2. a. The species of literature constituted by satires; satirical composition.
 b.  The employment, in speaking or writing, of sarcasm, irony, ridicule, etc. 
in exposing, denouncing, deriding, or ridiculing vice, folly, indecorum, 
abuses, or evils of any kind.
3. Satirical temper, disposition to use “satire”.
Overall, the OED definitions are evidently made both with reference to the 
rationale or point of satire and to its formal content, and these definienda lead in 
differing directions (Condren et al. 2008a: 288–290).4 In definition 1, ridicule is an 
essential feature, but if that is not exclusive to satire, we need more than this for 
a definition to do what is usually required of it, to distinguish from something 
4 The following comments on the dictionary definitions of satire elaborate on points made in 
Condren et al. (2008a: 288–290).
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else (Rosenheim 1963: 10). A little puzzling for a lexical definition is the reference 
to a less correct usage that by implication should be reserved for the word “lam-
poon”. In fact, such less correct use corresponds to Alexander Pope’s notion of 
“personal satire”, as opposed to the general satire earlier advocated by Erasmus 
and of which Pope was dismissive (Pope 1956 [1735]: 3.423). This suggests that the 
relationships between lampoon and satire are historically variable.5 Further, the 
ridicule central to definition 1 becomes contingent in definition 2b. Of course, 
lexical definitions typical of dictionaries like the OED need to embrace contradic-
tory patterns of use, but the contrast forewarns of difficulties ahead: 2a is circular, 
effectively stating that satire is made up of satires. In adding “etc.” to the possible 
features of satire 2b, the dictionary would seem to abandon any attempt at defini-
tion by reference to formal content.
What all these specifications of satire do share, however, is an element of 
censoriousness. I shall return to this later, but meanwhile note that if some sort of 
ethically critical edge is characteristic of satire, this is unlikely to be a uniquely 
defining feature or to provide an exclusive purpose, unless all instances of such 
criticism are tautologically deemed to be satire. Consider the following: remarks 
on a student’s plagiarized essay, a judge’s comments at the end of a competition, 
a mediator’s assessment of a contentious mechanical repair, or a dispute between 
a married couple, an appeal court judgment on the handling of a case from a 
lower court. All these can have a strongly moral force. But without something 
 additional, say an element of ridicule or irony (recognized by the OED), or humor 
(which seems not to be), to call them satiric would take us a long way from 
 predominant patterns of word-use, past or present. Another consequence would 
be to make a notion of satire so accommodating as to be valueless. Yet, Bailey’s 
Universal Dictionary of 1735 gives just such a definition: “all manner of Discourse 
wherein any Person is sharply reproved”. On the basis of OED definitinon 1, this 
is a definition in need of correction, and wanting any specific recognition that 
humor is important. Finally, note the OED’s Johnsonian emphasis on the works 
we now style literature. This is quite inadequate for modern usage (Condren et al. 
2008a: 290–291; Simpson 2003; Morreall 2005: 337–339). More significantly in this 
context it is additionally anachronistic for an historian, as the very notion of 
 literature is a relatively modern invention; and once carried back into the distant 
past to help organize a history of satire, a narrowing distortion will be evident. It 
would certainly jar with Bailey’s recognition that satire is not necessarily tied to 
good authors.
5 Rosenheim (1963: 28–31) comes close to regarding personal attack on a specific victim as a 
defining feature of satire. He does not discuss lampoon.
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Since it is closely related to the informing purpose suggested by definition 1c, 
we might start again with definition by function. This may well work for many 
things, not least physical objects such as chairs, but it is meaningless in dealing 
with those paradigmatic examples of Platonic definition, geometric figures. Just 
what is the function of a circle? Equally, complex intellectual phenomena such as 
satire carry and can be used for differing overall purposes. Dictionary definitions 
lead us to expect that the principal function is the exposure of stupidity or wrong-
doing, but as Rosenheim argues, some satire is intended not to expose, but  punish 
(Rosenheim 1963: 13–17). The punitive exploits some shared affront to propriety 
and helps explain how easily satire, assuming a fit object of condemnation, can 
have a further propagandistic end in group edification and consolidation. More-
over, the provocation of amusement and laughter, although not referred to in the 
definitions, has been a commonplace purpose for satire, a rare consummation 
which brings together academic with popular usage (Highet 1962: 22; Sutherland 
1962: 2–7).
A form of definition particularly relevant to the history of satire is by origin. It 
is a longstanding notion that an original use carries authority in and for the pres-
ent: Jacques Derrida was subject to its attractions in White mythology, arguing 
that in philosophical concepts lurked an incubus of an original, often metaphori-
cal use that continued to entrap and mislead philosophers who thought them-
selves in command of their own language (Derrida 1974; see also Rorty 1979: 137–
148). It is a point of relevance especially to Renaissance attempts to understand 
satire. To give an indication of the issues involved in determining origination will 
help further illustrate problems of definition.
A putative origin in the Greek satyr plays that accompanied early tragedy and 
then developed into Attic comedy was questioned by Julius Caesar Scaliger 
(1484–1558) and seemingly disproved by Isaac Casaubon (1559–1614). He effec-
tively supported the claim by the Roman rhetorician Quintilian (AD 35–c.100), 
that satire was a Roman invention (Casaubon 1605; Quintilian 1920–1922: 10.1.93). 
Casaubon argued that the word satire derived from the Latin, satura, medley or 
stew; and something of this etymology survived in English with “satira” being a 
broad platter (Bailey 1735; Facciolatus and Forcellinus 1828).6 Casaubon’s case 
has largely been accepted from John Dryden to the twentieth century (Dryden 
1693; Highet 1962).
Just what was understood by Roman satire, however, is not altogether clear. 
The very term connotes a richness and variety that even defies specific expressive 
6 Facciolatus and Forcellinus, in Totius latinitatis lexicon, cite satura/satira as a platter for 
varieties of food, noting the Greek spelling σατυρα as an older form (1828: vol. 2, 487). A large 
number of the Latin sat terms concern food, saity, sufficiency, gluttony, others seed-sowing.
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forms; and from the surviving evidence, there was little attempt to impose a theo-
retical shape or disclose an essence that might establish a clear definition. C. J. 
Classon even suggests that this helps explain why satirists so frequently justify 
what they are doing, as otherwise the reader might not know (Classon 1998: 98). 
Satire was less associated with Roman comedy, which today we might see as sa-
tiric, than with a particular style of morally critical poetry exemplified most obvi-
ously by Juvenal (c.60–c.130) and Horace (65–8 BCE). The force of Quintilian’s 
claim was to sever a general dependence on what was seen as Greek cultural 
domination, irrespective of what the Romans had more precisely done for satire. 
It might seem then that, at most, Roman origins circumscribed the terrain on 
which a definition could be carved out and weakened associations with comedy. 
But the matter was not straightforward and etymological scholarship by no 
means extinguished the notion that satire extended to, or came from the Greek. 
Petrus Nannius (1500–1557) in an argument that substantially pre-dated Casau-
bon’s but was not published until 1608, suggested a dual origin from “sat” (a 
rarer root in Greek than Latin); and the Dutch scholar Daniel Heinsius (1580–
1655) claimed that the bowl called a satira lanx and carried by Greek satyrs evi-
denced a Greek origin (de Smet 1996: 35–36, 49).
It might be concluded that although the Romans invented the term to be de-
fined, the concept itself was originally Greek. This is superficially appealing and 
has encouraged at least one modern scholar to deepen and broaden the origins of 
satire to include ritualized invective found in Hellenic and other cultures (Elliott 
1960). It involves, however, presupposing a highly questionable separation 
 between concepts and the very words that provide the evidence for them. It is 
nearer the truth to say that our later strong associations of satire with humor 
 encourage extending the range of the satiric back to embrace the Greek rhetori-
cal  and comedic notion that laughter was ridicule of folly and wrongdoing. 
 Aristotle’s important reflections on laughter and ridicule, from The Rhetoric and 
Poetics were assimilated to satire only through later translation. Thus in ridicule 
and tropes adjacent to it, we have something that helps hold together the varying 
rationalities for a general conception of satire, not just in “literature” but across 
rhetoric, drama and poetics. But this does not make definition of the word satire 
any easier; as Feinberg notes, even if one recognizes a compound rationale for 
satire, not all that is deemed satiric neatly complies (Feinberg 1963: 6; see also 
Rosenheim 1963: 2–9).
What also was understood in the Renaissance was that definition concerned 
not a thing (something encouraged by the definitional function of the Platonic 
forms that were of things as well as concepts), but rather that the emphasis was 
on a word, its origins and its range, and indeed its suggestive metaphorical migra-
tion from objects like food and pottery to an elaborate variegated intellectual 
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 activity. People writing in the sixteenth century had available austere and 
 demanding notions of what a definition could do and what was needed for one. 
For the Sorbonne logician George Lokert (d.1547), for example, a good definition 
required symmetry of terms, explanatory power and economy (Brodie 1983: 33–4; 
Lokert [1523?], text in Brodie: 192–193).7 Lokert and his contemporaries were also 
legatees of an important logical distinction between real and nominal defini-
tions, established probably by William of Ockham in the fourteenth century, 
whose Summa remains one of the landmarks of formal philosophy (Ockham 1957–
1962). Real definitions attempted to encompass the whole nature of something 
existing, they were descriptions; nominal definitions referred to word use. Al-
though it remains possible to talk casually of defining things, a definition more 
rigorously understood in nominal terms establishes protocols for word use, en-
courages the precision of special meanings and so leads to stipulative definitions, 
often limited to a given theory or field of discourse (see generally Henry 1972: 
30–42; Ashworth 1988: 143–172; Jardine 1988: 173–198). It is not unrelated to 
the broader (Ockhamist) philosophical point (to become important in the post-
Renaissance world) that truth is not a thing outside discourse to be discovered 
(again something encouraged by Plato’s metaphors of intellection). It is, rather, 
recognition of propositional coherence, an argument strongly associated with 
writers like Hobbes and Descartes. Certainly it would now be accepted that we 
do not define a chair but only how the word “chair” can be used in what sorts of 
semantic relationships and circumstances. The notion of a real definition has 
changed to being an indication that definitions can have a non-verbal reference 
function. These diverging understandings are captured in just one of the succinct 
abridgments of the word definition (note they do not all agree) in Bailey’s Univer-
sal Etymological Dictionary: “Definition, a short and plain Declaration or Descrip-
tion of the Meaning of a Word, or the essential Attributes of a Thing”.8
At this stage, the issue of definitional implication arises and thus the range 
of a term defined. Definition works precisely because it is exclusive, and so there 
is the question whether exclusivity or economy has been too abruptly circum-
scribed. This suggests the direct relevance of a notion of definition strongly asso-
ciated with C. S. Peirce, that the meaning of a concept is the sum of its implica-
tions (e.g. Peirce 1960: para 18).9 This is important, but not all implications are 
necessarily definitionally decisive. Satire, for example, entails recognition of 
7 The full text of Lokert’s De terminis is reprinted in Brodie (1983).
8 The OED has a separate entry for definition in mathematics and includes explanation, 
determination and decision-making under the verb to define.
9 Peirce’s various formulations of this principle occurred over many years in both popular and 
technical writings and helped define “pragmatism”.
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 human agency and intentionality, but the relationship is asymmetrical. Inten-
tionality may be an aspect of much beyond satire. A fortiori with respect to hu-
mor, even if it were true that all satire sought to be humorous, humor extends so 
far beyond satire that reference to it can only provide the incomplete beginnings 
of a definition. If implication is taken strictly, a definition that overlooks some 
implications will, through logical incoherence alone, be under extreme pressure 
to be expanded. Thus, as Nannius realized, aside from its hexametric poetic form 
and the trivial fact that the language was Latin, it was difficult to treat Roman 
satire as insulated from Greek theatre (de Smet: 1996: 35–36). Rome was, after all, 
profoundly indebted to Hellenic culture. Again, Rosenheim distinguishes persua-
sive from punitive satire, associating only the former with rhetoric, the latter with 
principles and perceptions the satirist already shares with an audience. But per-
suasion depends upon the exploitation of shared communal expectations and 
prejudices. For Aristotle, for example, one would have been unintelligible with-
out recognizing the other as a strict implication; that is, accepted truths, prior 
judgments, and prejudices are the resources needed for suasive acts. Rhetoric, 
then, cannot operate to delineate one type of satire from another. Yet, insofar as 
notions of implication and consequence are taken loosely, the scope of many a 
concept is likely to be uncertain and its nature open to dispute. Peirce’s emphasis 
was on the logic of conceptual relationships, though he also insisted on the direct 
relevance, the “conceivable bearing” a concept might have on conduct (Peirce 
1960 [1905]: para 412). Through writers such as William James (see, for example, 
Peirce 1960 [1903]: para 2), conceivable bearing came increasingly to subsume 
more contingent patterns of association and practical effect, the consequence of 
which is close to deferring the meaning of any defined concept. Ferdinand Schil-
ler even appeared to entertain the self-defeating belief that a definition embraces 
its context (Schiller 1929).
With satire, there has always been continuing pressure for the sort of concep-
tual expansion illustrated by the widening meanings of pragmatism and prag-
matic conceptual definition. This potential is effectively signaled in the early 
Greco-Roman problem of origination touched on above; for this was itself an im-
plication of the accommodating notion of satire as a medley, a mixed mode of 
writing, as in the prosimetric satires of Varro (116–27 BCE). But the written word 
itself may provide an undue restriction if we accept that the visual arts may be 
symbolically meaningful, and so may be used to express critical humor. The 
Cerne Abbas giant etched into the chalk hills of Dorset may not, as is commonly 
believed, be a relic of a Romano-British fertility cult, but a mid-seventeenth-
century satiric graffito (Darvill et al. 1999). Many of the woodcuts that came with 
the printing press can be considered satiric, and so too the cartoons popular from 
the eighteenth century, although these also have often had a linguistic dimen-
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sion. The contemporary imperative might be the need to add a greater diversity 
of  non-verbal media to the satira-dish (Condren et al. 2008a: 291–292; 2008b: 
412–415). In a word, satire illustrates a frequent tension between definiens and 
definiendum that threatens either to over-extend any definition or, conversely, to 
make a definition so narrow as to exclude much of what cannot escape direct 
consideration.
These general comments can be given more substance with reference to what 
is called Menippean satire.10 Superficially, this should seem easier to define be-
cause it is only a sub-set of a more nebulous identity and, moreover, is a form of 
satire firmly tied to humor. Yet, in fact it provides a microcosm of the wider defi-
nitional difficulties, clarifying a stark opposition between definitional preconcep-
tions about satire as such.
Menippean satire can initially be taken as satire using the figure of the Greek 
cynic philosopher, Menippus of Gadera, (third century BCE), irascible and given 
to direct, even brutal honesty or parrhesia. Nothing by Menippus is known and 
only fragments and indirect accounts of Varro’s Saturae Menippeae survive. Since 
these were apparently in imitation of Menippus, they add a further complication 
to the issue of Greek or Roman origins of satire. Perhaps it is fittingly symbolic of 
a medley of possibilities that a disproportionate amount of what we do have was 
written by Lucian of Samosata (c.120–180), a Syrian writing in Greek during the 
Second Sophistic of Rome, who sometimes used Menippus to carry the burden of 
his humorously critical song (Relihan 1980; Jones 1986; Robinson 1979). His fa-
mous boast was to have made the philosophical dialogue laugh.
Yet by no means all of his works use the figure of Menippus, and the issue 
immediately arises: are they to be excluded on this technicality? In addition, 
since he is but one voice carrying the same range of Lucianic themes, there is 
pressure to collapse the Menippean into the broader Lucianic.
Eugene Kirk, following the analysis of Northrop Frye, has written the most 
compendious account of Menippean satire to date. Kirk lists, as markers of the 
Menippean and Lucianic, a medley of themes such as travelers’ tales, digres-
sions, mock encomia, deliberate incoherences, lies, fantasies and dreams (see, at 
length, Kirk 1980). Not surprisingly, parrhesia or direct honesty may either be 
present, disingenuously paraded, or absent through indirection and irony. Most 
of these would become features of the Menippean figure of Hythlodaeus in 
 Thomas More’s Utopia (1516). Especially given the play with internal contradic-
tion and digression, these characteristics cannot, in any Peircian sense, form a 
10 The brief discussion of Menippean satire and the remarks on genre offered here are 
developed in more detail elsewhere (see Condren 2011: 19–27).
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set of mutual implications. So, how many need to be apparent to warrant using 
the label “Menippean”, and is this a sufficient basis for a definition?
The butts of the satire are similarly various: priests, philosophers, rhetori-
cians and grammarians. Superficially, the list gives some initial definitional pur-
chase, because the common, though not exclusive focus is on the delusions of the 
mind (Sherbert 1996: 1); and so at least excludes those conventional victims of 
satire, politicians. But seizing on intellectual failings, pars pro toto, has led to 
further definitional confusion. W. Scott Blanchard defines the Menippean as 
prose that is at once learned and paradoxically anti-intellectual (Blanchard 1995: 
14). Yet satire against the misuse of the intellect need hardly be anti-intellectual. 
Further, as categories like philosopher or rhetorician are themselves unstable and 
potentially overlapping, the excluded can always slip in by the back door: clerics, 
for example, were frequently satirized because they could be taken as politicians 
(Jones 1986: 33–45). Gary Sherbert, who also over-emphasizes the intellectual 
 nature of Menippean satire, is led to refer to it as a self-consciousness of wit sati-
rizing wit (Sherbert 1996: 3). Since wit was, and always has been, a decidedly 
variable and elusive notion (“Comely in a thousand shapes”, “we only can by 
Negatives define”), we are brought no closer to an effective definition (Cowley 
1986 [1656]: 1665). Howard Weinbrot has provided the most sophisticated attempt 
to contain the complexities within a genre, and has identified the defining trait of 
the Menippean as a fear of orthodoxy (Weinbrot 2005: 1–7, 16–19). But even if this 
is plausible for texts beyond the many he discusses, that fear extended well be-
yond the Menippean. A common denominator is not necessarily a discriminator.
This must all seem unsatisfactory: Menippean encompasses what has been 
done by whomever in the name of Menippus or Lucian; or, without reference to 
either, what has been done that echoes Lucianic themes and might allude to Me-
nippus, either in prose, in poetry or in a mixture of both. Heterogeneity seems 
unbounded. In the sixteenth century, Petrus Nannius thought that Boethius’ Con-
solation of Philosophy (c.524) was close to being Menippean satire because of its 
composite modal structure (de Smet 1996: 35). This anticipates the overly accom-
modating notion that the Menippean has become: Swift, More, Rabelais, Beckett, 
Nabokov, Pynchon and dozens of others, not least Monty Python’s Holy Grail and 
The Life of Brian, are, in Kirk’s terms, Menippean. It is little wonder that Bakhtin 
could also appropriate the term as a festive jest to his questionable notion of the 
carnivalesque (Bakhtin 1968; for effective critique, see Malcolm 1997: 117–119; 
Gurevich 1997: 54–60; Weinbrot 2005: 12–15). Recalling Plato’s Euthyphro, one 
can see that Menippean satire means something, but lacks the paradeigma to 
tell us precisely what. As presumably it must come within the larger category of 
satire, the possibility of a tight definition for satire as such, let alone as a genre, 
appears to be a dish eaten away from the inside before it reaches the table. The 
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situation might leave a logician like George Lokert both starved and distracted 
(Brodie 1983: 33–35; Lokert in Brodie 1983: 192–193).
Arguing against precisely this ecumenical messiness, Ingrid de Smet insists 
that Menippean should be restricted to its original Renaissance meaning. The sat-
ire must be prosimetric and conveyed through a dream motif in which Menippus 
figures (de Smet 1996: 23–31). De Smet takes as a progenitor the Apocolocyntosis 
(The Gourdification of the Divine Claudius) by the philosopher and statesman 
 Seneca (4 BCE–65), a satire of the Emperor Claudius’s failed attempt to get into 
Heaven. She argues, however, that the foundational, definitive example is Justus 
Lipsius’ Somnium (1581), a fictional dream about the failings of modern scholar-
ship, followed by Petrus Cunaeus’ Sadi venales, (1612) in which the dream be-
comes a nightmare (Lipsius 1980 [1581]; Cunaeus 1980 [1612]).
De Smet, in effect, appeals to the authority of origins, but not without a cer-
tain arbitrariness. Erasmus’s Morae Encomium/Praise of Folly (1515) was associ-
ated strongly enough with the Menippean to be republished with Lipsius’ and 
Cunaeus’ works in 1617 (Matheussen and Heersekkers 1980: 19). Her focus also 
excludes More’s Utopia, and Richard Pace’s Julius Exclusus (1513), a failed attempt 
by a politician/pope to get into Heaven modeled on Seneca’s ‘Gourdification’ of 
Claudius. These were all works self-consciously and explicitly written as in some 
way Menippean (see Curtis 1996: 184–260). Erasmus and More were both transla-
tors of Lucian. Thus de Smet privileges a specific dream motif, rather than the 
functionally very similar ones of, say, a dialogue with the dead, or a council of the 
gods, over the point of using any of them. The result is a definition so narrow as 
to be useless unless one is talking about a mere handful of neo-Latin scholars; the 
problem is the obverse of Kirk’s inclusive generosity. Like many definitions in 
books, de Smet’s might best be taken as a synoptic description of the scope of 
the study, rather than as a definition of a phenomenon as a whole (see also Sher-
bert 1996: 1–3; Rosenheim 1963: 31). Crucially, her argument evidences a shift in 
definition away from general lexical comprehensiveness to the highly stipulative. 
Although this is a valuable corrective to lack of discrimination, sometimes, as 
John Caputo has noted, the very drive to precision can inadvertently create what 
is not in the evidence (Caputo 2000: 46). Definitional tidying can be a euphemism 
for invention.
Here lies the underlying definitional difference to which a discussion of the 
Menippean leads us: de Smet is working within the terms of a broadly Platonic 
ideal, the search for a cohering essence. Kirk has abandoned such an ideal 
in   order to rely more on what W. B. Gallie and William Connolly have called 
 “cluster concepts” (Gallie 1964: 105–110; Connolly 1983: 10–12). This alternative is 
derived from Wittgenstein’s elliptical but suggestive remarks on “family resem-
blance” (Wittgenstein 1968: paras 66–67). The proposition runs as follows: we 
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can identify members of the same family, not necessarily by any shared, essential 
feature like the famous Hapsburg chin, but by virtue of a contingent range of 
characteristics, some of which overlap sufficiently between members of the group 
for a  resemblance to be created. On this basis, we can simplify an abstracted im-
age of Menippean satire (MS) as having only a small cluster of characteristics, 
such as (a) dream motifs, (b) dialogues with the dead, (c) unreliable narration, (d) 
 traveler’s tales, (e) inherent contradiction and (f) mock encomia, and initially 
schematize examples of it thus:
MS1 (a,b,c); MS2 (a,c,f); MS3 (b,d,f); MS3 (b,d,e); MS4 . . .
If applicable to Menippean satire, the designation of a family resemblance 
may be even more fitting to the broader category of satire; and to accept the point 
is to move to the very edge of what a definition might be. This is especially the 
case if these formal features are variably tied to the putative ends of satire (moral 
criticism E1, amusement E2, and group consolidation E3); and also if they exhibit 
ridicule, irony, or some form of humor. The matter is complicated further if we 
drop the pretense, or modeling convenience, that the informing ends provide us 
with neat exclusive answers as to what a satire is really directed towards, and 
dispense also with the fiction that the inherent features are all neatly separable 
components. A traveler’s tale can easily enough be contradictory and unreliable; 
a mock encomium is likely to be so. A more adequate picture of the Menippean 
may then look like this:
MS1 (a,b,c) E1; MS2 (a,c,f) E1; MS3 (b,d,f) E2; MS4 (a,b,c) E3; MS5 (b,d,a) E1/2 . . .
With few variables, we can have a highly ramified family tree that does go 
some way towards giving order to what can be a bewildering phenomenon. Un-
derstanding by family resemblance is better seen as an argument for stopping 
short of a definition as traditionally understood, for being satisfied instead with a 
porous classifier, or what I shall call a characterization. While there are, indeed, 
a fair number of concepts that might be understood in these terms, the principal 
consequence of stopping with a characterization is to suggest that such notions 
are inherently, essentially contestable because they have as intrinsic to them dif-
fering criteria of application. Essential contestability is a notion open to abuse, 
easily dwindling into a euphemism for anything goes (Mason 1993: 47–68); but it 
has enough validity to help explain some of the differences canvassed above with 
respect to Menippean satire.
Such a conceptual characterization of satire has one crucial historiographi-
cal advantage and a conceptual or theoretical disadvantage. It may capture refer-
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ence to the word satire with minimal distortion and with instructive inclusiveness 
over the whole historical range. Conversely, it may be rejected precisely because 
it is insufficiently restrictive. If the reason for charting word-use is to circumscribe 
a specific concept, then exploring full patterns of employment can prove irritat-
ingly beside the point, or open to distracting dispute. What the historian might 
need to embrace in order to avoid the over-schematized and anachronistic, the 
lawyer might see as frustrating the present-centered requirements of precedent, 
the philosopher might find tainted with irrelevance, and the literary critic might 
conclude is inadequate for isolating great satire (Rosenheim 1963: 7–8).11 Much 
ultimately depends on the sort of enquiry to hand.
So a different tack might be tried. Rather than asking what the content of 
satire is, regardless of whether we can detect in it an essence or single informing 
purpose, we might ask which neighboring concepts help limit its range, or, to 
 allude to Cowley on wit, help “by Negatives [to] define”. Words like lampoon, 
burlesque and parody can help contextualize the meaning of satire, but to do so, 
there also needs to be some prior understanding of what they mean. This is an-
other version of Meno’s paradox. Again, analyses of this sort go back to antiquity 
and were explored in medieval and early modern theories of semantics. It became 
something of a truism in the early modern world that words take on meaning only 
in relationship to each other; as John Pym put it (Pym 1999 [1641]: 1.131), every-
thing exists by way of relation. Aristotle’s understanding of definition by mean 
(μησον), to which I shall briefly return, is perhaps the most influential example. 
Complex moral categories discussed in the Nichomachean ethics are posited as 
existing as means between negative delineating extremes. Thus, generosity lies 
between parsimony and extravagance, courage between rashness and cowardice 
(Aristotle 1966: 2.6.1107a–1109b).
Bi-conditional semantic pairings can function in a similar way. Thus hus-
band stands in the bi-conditional relationship with wife, up with down, virtue 
with vice and so on. Take one away and the other’s meaning must be transformed 
or destroyed. Yet with satire, definition by mean or bi-conditionality is difficult 
to achieve because its semantic neighbors are unlikely to be any more stable. If 
satire is a mean, what are the circumscribing forms of the non-satiric? Perhaps it 
lies between compliment and invective; but this still does not get us far, for a 
statement with no satiric intent might also occupy the same semantic space. Con-
versely, how does satire help define a mean? I cannot think of a reliable way in 
which it does.
11 Unless, however, the cards are going to be stacked, no definition of satire is going to 
distinguish the good from the bad; this depends upon qualitative criteria brought to bear on 
what is called satire. I have discussed such matters at length in Condren (1985).
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I have already noted the variable relationship satire has with lampoon;  others 
exist with parody, burlesque and allegory.12 There can be collocations such as 
satiric parody, and satiric allegory, but there can also be parody or allegory 
 without what we might consider satire and vice versa. These terms too have 
 variable histories. Moreover, if we can be satisfied with a characterization of 
 satire, it is possible to move much closer to a formal definition of parody. For this 
is always an adaptive descant (not necessarily critical or satiric) on a previous 
creative artifact (Rose 1979); so parody of specifies a formal relationship with 
something and is a more informative notion than satire of, which indicates only 
a  contingent subject matter. Allegory provides a trickier relationship. Ellen 
 Leyburn considers its definition more difficult than that of satire but suggests that 
the two are easy bedfellows because satire, like allegory, has its essence in indi-
rection (Leyburn 1969: 4–5, 8–9). We might try telling that to aggressive satirists 
such as Alexander Pope, Auberon Waugh, P. J. O’Rourke, or even the sometimes 
straight-speaking Menippus. It is discouraging to reflect that the critical term to 
which detailed attention is given always seems to be perceived as the problem-
atic one, while those to which it is related are held to be more straightforward. 
Perhaps without such untoward optimism, we would not get far with defining 
anything.
Finding an antonym for the satiric (analogous to vice for virtue, up for down) 
is also elusive, as might be expected. Leyburn’s implicit reliance on a contrast 
between direct and indirect is unsatisfactory. The most obvious candidate here, 
however, is the notion of the serious and non-serious, (e.g. Bateson 1972: 173–192; 
Grice 1975: 41–59; for discussion see Attardo 1994: 271–292), as exemplified in the 
contrast between the railway timetable (perhaps not a good example) and the 
joke (such as the last cheap one). To locate satire in the domain of the serious is 
to eliminate humor from definitional consideration; to locate it in the non-serious 
presupposes humor to be essential, and ethical critique superfluous. On either 
hand, there are problems. Jokes may well violate the conditions of serious, co-
operative, or mutually informative discourse, and not all humor can be reduced 
to joking (Attardo 1994: 271–277). Moreover, a good deal of satire explicitly 
 transgresses any bifurcation between serious and non-serious, drawing its 
 power from shifting between or combining the two. The informing drive behind 
Lucian’s  satire was, through the comic, to say what was serious: serio ludere. It is 
for this reason that satire finds a place in that most serious mode of discourse, 
12 John Jump (1972: 1–2) surveys such conceptual relationships with respect to burlesque, and 
satire is not amongst them. However, his category of the Hudibrastic could as easily have been 
discussed as satire, or even Menippean satire (Jump 1972: 12–17).
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philosophy.13 But the counterpoint is also true for some satire, as dictionary defi-
nitions clearly indicate. What has been designated satire has not always been 
intended as in any way humorous or joking. From this flows the notion of ‘comic 
satire’ to distinguish a less serious kind of satire from works in imitation of Juve-
nal. There is also the customary designation of Orwell’s 1984 as satire (Leyburn 
1969: 125–134). Thus James Sutherland, who writes much good sense on satire as 
an intentional rhetoric of censorious humor, proceeds to include as an example 
a discordant 1984 (1949), seemingly on the grounds that about the same time 
 Orwell wrote Animal Farm (Sutherland 1962: 21).
It may well be the case that over its long history, the humorous has become 
increasingly important in satire beyond the Menippean, yet to read humor back 
as an essential feature of anything called a satire, let alone define satire in terms 
of it, is bound to distort. When Henry Neville, in the voice of Machiavelli, assured 
the reader that the Prince was a satire, it was to argue only that the work exposed 
the wicked and had no bearing on a virtuous ruler like Charles II; when Garrett 
Mattingly revived the thesis of the satiric Prince, the meaning of the designation 
had been augmented. Although noting difficulties of definition, his argument de-
pended in part on Cesare Borjia, a central figure in the work, being a laughing-
stock, with the work itself a being a “joke” (Neville 1675 n.p.; Mattingly 1958: 491).
What, then, of satire as the use of ridicule? Once again, this is not essential. 
Irony stops well short of ridicule but can be sufficient to identify a satiric edge to 
something, such as the well-known opening sentence of Jane Austen’s Pride and 
Prejudice (1813): “It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in pos-
session of a good fortune, must be in want of a wife”. Where ridicule is important, 
its relationship to humor is also slippery. Satire can ridicule, often viciously, but 
the use of ridicule may not be co-extensive with provoking a sense of the ridicu-
lous. That is, ridicule may either be intrinsic, or it may be a desired response to 
the satire. Mattingly’s reading of Machiavelli’s Prince depends precisely on that 
easily overlooked distinction: Machiavelli does not ridicule, but for the Prince to 
be satire, he must have intended his audience to laugh at Cesare Borjia. Joseph 
Hall (1574–1656) wrote Satires that are not the slightest bit funny (though I may 
have missed something); but the targets are presented to the reader as worthy of 
ridicule, his own tone as harsh or sour (Hall: 1824 [1597]: xciii–xcviii). It is the 
dyspepsia expressive of moral affront: Hall was a young man in want of ecclesias-
tical advancement.
13 It is possible that if the conventional history of philosophy as studied by philosophers were 
itself not so propositionally artificial, and hence included satiric philosophy and its humor, the 
opposition between the serious and the non-serious would not have had so much weight put 
upon it.
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There are an increasing number of terms that have had to be noted here as 
falling within the ambit of satire and so providing definitional bearings. This sug-
gests the relevance of locating satire within a semantic field of the sort Salvatore 
Attardo has outlined for humor and in which the word satire itself has a place 
(Attardo 1994: 7). Such overlapping fields of terms are, of course, abstractions 
from the play of pragmatic use over time and space, and semantic and associa-
tional fields in natural languages are not always mutually equivalent (Eco 2003: 
183–93). As Margeurite Wells has shown, in Japanese, comedy (kigeki), satire 
( fûshi), farce ( faasu or shōgeki), all terms that may be subsumed under the lone-
word humor (yûmoa), do not mean the same things as their English counterparts. 
Kigeki is associated so strongly with a specific form of humor that the farcical and 
sometimes satiric kyōgen accompanying the masked Nō theatre can be difficult to 
classify as comedy; above all, satire’s range of meanings is greatly diminished, 
and its presence is often elusive (Wells 2006: 193–197; Davis and Wells 2006: 127–
152). In a word, field theory makes a definition that copes with the full vagaries of 
terminological relationships if anything more, not less, difficult (Ullmann 1972: 
243–253; Condren 1994: 2–4). As Attardo remarks of humor, so we might con-
clude for satire, that any essentialist definition is inadequate to the task (Attardo 
1996: 3).
All this convolution is, no doubt, frustrating, for despite all, most of us would 
be able to identify satire with a fair degree of reliability. We might not have a 
 definitional paradeigma, but, like Euthyphro regarding proper conduct, we can 
point to what can reasonably be taken as examples. His father should not have 
killed a slave, even one suspected of murder.14 Throughout this discussion, I have 
been drawing largely on works that would un-problematically be called satire, 
and it is easy on that basis to assume fallaciously, after Plato, that to rely on 
the foremost examples of satire (in one sense of the word paradigmatic) is to rely 
on those that best fit a definition, a paradeigma, as conceptual model for the 
whole. To expect so much of a definition is bound to lead either to disappoint-
ment, or to definitions that best fit a favored author (see, for example, Rosenheim 
1963: 8–31).
Here it is important to explicate a common misconception about definitions: 
often they are not needed, though the demand for them can arise because of the 
uncertainties over their application. A formal definition of high, for example, is 
redundant because the word makes sense in its bi-conditional relationship 
with low. High is not low. I appreciate this sounds a little like Baldrick of the BBC 
14 This is the dramatic point of Plato’s telling us that the slave is probably a villain; it displays 
Euthyphro’s capacity for ethical discrimination. What he lacks is the security of judgment that, 
according to Plato only a philosophical understanding can provide.
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comedy series Blackadder, who in trying to re-write Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary over-
night, defined “cat” as “not a dog”. The problem, however, lies in how and where 
to apply a term like “high” (high price, high mountain, high hill). Recognition of 
this is crucial to Aristotle’s definition by mean. For he insists that the mean is not 
to be taken in an absolute sense but varied according to circumstances. Giving an 
athlete enough food is a mean between excess and insufficiency; but sufficiency 
will depend on the person concerned. Thus the mean provides a vocabulary: 
 application is the end or reason for having such a word.
At this stage, it can be said that all instances of satire to which I have alluded 
do have one informing characteristic, namely moral seriousness; the serio in 
 Lucian’s ludere; the follies and vices that the OED says are ridiculed or ironically 
underlined. This intentional thread of ethical critique has been pervasive. Al-
though the relationship between censoriousness and satire is asymmetric, sati-
rists have traditionally claimed moral seriousness. It is not necessary for us to 
believe them all to be sincere, nor to accept their values or their treatment of 
 others, nor to admire any artistry with which they express their putative passion. 
It is the species of claim that is important. And making some ethical point, or 
displaying some moral seriousness has indeed been a more reliable guide to 
 satire overall than the exhibition or provocation of humor. This aspect of satire, 
however, would be more helpful if the content of the moral vocabulary on which 
satirists can draw were stable. But ethical and intellectual categories and 
 standards – what in practice people have called right and wrong, rational or 
 foolish, admirable or shameful – have varied between societies, over time, and 
between groups in societies. To recognize this, as an historian must, is not neces-
sarily to embrace a metaphysical doctrine of ethical relativism, but rather to con-
front a fact about language and its use.
Because of this variation, it is little wonder that satire surviving from different 
and distant societies can often take some comprehending. Even within a given 
community, differences in the way in which a shared moral terminology is ap-
plied, even differences in the very vocabulary of morality, help explain why satire 
might have differing thresholds of appreciation, tolerance or recognition. In 
short, it is clear that once again the problem lies in application, not definition. 
Consequently, we may anticipate that satire within a society with which we are 
familiar will be easier to grasp than satire coming from an alien environment. 
Indeed, it should even be easier to define, if need be. Any simple appeal to the 
shared senses of rectitude and rationality which give rise to points of critique over 
the longue durée, however, will move us towards a definition so abstract as to 
 include a great deal we would not want to call satiric. Alternatively; it will be 
 naïve and merely pass the definitional buck to the content of morality and sound 
reasoning.
Brought to you by | University of Queensland - UQ Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/12/15 9:14 AM
392   Conal Condren
The historian certainly cannot pre-empt questions of what counts as vice and 
folly by taking self-proclaiming satirists at their own word, or even by using a 
definition of satire legislatively, as moral theorists might, to bracket and exclude 
uses that do not fit. We are not going to understand twentieth-century satire if we 
isolate that which came from Nazi Germany as just being propaganda.15 Include 
it, and we can appreciate that satire can be created and used for clearly propagan-
distic purposes. Consider the BBC series Yes Minister and Yes Prime Minister. 
These very popular television programs rather took for granted stereotypical im-
ages of public servants and politicians, and they became of propagandistic value 
to Margaret Thatcher’s drive to reform the British Civil Service. Satires on war 
such as John Arbuthnot’s History of John Bull, (1712), the perennially replayed 
television series M*A*S*H, and Joseph Heller’s Catch 22 are predominantly 
 propaganda for peace. Or, again, consider Andrew Marvell’s Last Instructions to 
a Painter (1667) a work that needs to be seen simultaneously as parody, propa-
ganda and satire.
An additional complication, I suspect, is the increasing use of the word satire 
to displace moral seriousness. It maybe that as so much satire has become main-
stream, mass entertainment, that the moral edge is blunted, or (to allude again to 
Alexander Pope’s distinction) is being concentrated on acceptably safe targets, 
and so treads carefully around contemporary patterns of taboo and sensitivity. As 
a consequence, when satire generates outrage or distaste, we can be told, it was 
only satire. Thus effectively consigned to the realm of the non-serious, satire can 
contract into really being only a joke – though how many jokes are only that is a 
moot point. This potential for humor to insulate satire has long been latent. In the 
sixteenth century, a joke might be argued to come within the range of the non-
malicious, ideally, or potentially allowing free speech with some protection from 
persecution (Curtis 2006: 90–91).16 Capitalizing on the associations of purely 
comic satire may intimate a significant shift in the meaning of satire as a whole. If 
satire as merely joking is to be included in the range of a definition of the satiric, 
the recent working definition of satire put forward by my colleagues and I might 
require adjustment, or needs recognizing as weakly stipulative for the purposes 
of applying copyright law. It reads as follows: “the critical impulse manifesting 
itself in some degree of denigration, almost invariably through attempted hu-
mour”. (Condren et al. 2008b: 413).
15 Cf. Sutherland, (1962: 21) who clearly regards satire and propaganda as simply oppositional.
16 Griffin has argued that satire is stimulated more by oppressive than by accommodating 
political regimes (Griffin 1994: 138–40), but the issue of humor’s relationship to political 
toleration is too complex and variable to respond to any dichotomous formulation.
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It might, then, be concluded, albeit a little lamely, that satire is a complex, 
even at times an incoherent genre exhibiting the heterogeneity of Menippean 
 satire augmented; but this consideration directly raises the question of the extent 
to which the word genre is even appropriate. And its usefulness is more easily 
questioned if we put to one side the belief that satire is fundamentally a literary 
phenomenon. The notion of a genre has strongly been associated with literary 
analysis and leads us to expect the presence of certain general, formal, even re-
quired properties, such as those of plot, motif and structure, all susceptible to 
definition (Classon 1998: 95–121; Weinbrot 2005: 4–7). Such properties can then 
seem to facilitate what has also been important to literary analysis, the isolation 
and appraisal of quality and achievement. Any form of creative activity that has 
more than one salient feature, however, may become an invitation for someone to 
ignore an aspect of what is expected and replace it with something else; in fact, 
working within a tradition usually involves exactly this kind of adaptation. The 
type of Japanese-language poetry called haiku, for example, has an exemplary 
formal rigidity allowing easy definition, but such strict syllabic rules for a genre 
can spawn the need for different classifications. Haiku has given rise to a derivate, 
often-comic genre, senryū (Kobayashi 2006: 164–70; Davis and Wells 2006: 153–
77). The thirty-one syllabic tanka has similarly produced the parodic, even pos-
sibly, mildly satiric kyōka:17 both senryū and kyōka are now treated as distinct 
genres (Takanashi 2007: 235–259).
Most genres, however, survive with a somewhat spurious unity by giving al-
together less guidance as to what might be encompassed by them. The necessary 
construct becomes necessarily uncertain (Weinbrot 2005: 4). We can make sense 
of and understand John Gay’s play, The What D’Ye Call It (1715) but when it was 
written, Gay knew it did not fit any preconceived mode of writing, and helpfully 
sub-titled it “A Tragi-Comi-Pastoral Farce”. It was also, in fact, satiric parody 
(Nokes 1995: 180–189). If, as de Smet correctly claimed, the notion of Menippean 
satire (excepting, of course, her own stipulation) stretches to breaking point the 
notion of genre, the wider category of satire surely explodes it. Moreover, as 
 Stephen Orgel has argued, our understanding of genre as somehow designating 
an exclusive form or mode of creativity (e.g. Dutch still life, epic poem, farce etc.) 
itself departs from older conceptions in which genre was much closer to an as-
pect of a more complex whole (Orgel 1987: 4–5; 1979: 10–23). Looking at satire as 
a definable genre over the historical range of its uses becomes fundamentally 
misleading, especially if we consider its confused and slippery Greco-Roman 
17 For skepticism concerning the satiric in Japanese culture, see Wells (2006); Davis and 
Wells, (2006: 145–50).
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 expressions. Definition in terms of genre can run into obfuscatory incoherence by 
half recognizing the inappropriateness of the concept to satire, yet relying on the 
word regardless (see, for example, Coombe and Connery 1995: 5). It has been of 
a piece with the misleading preconception, noted at the outset that in defining 
satire, one is defining the finest examples of a type of literature.
Such generic expectation is, it seems to me, a further residue of the Platonic 
project to find forms by which the world can be given coherence. The search is for 
an abstract noun, logos, to encompass the discourse, a logos we can call satire. It 
is a natural feature of European languages that are dependent on a clear distinc-
tion between subject and object: we are encouraged to look for something like a 
thing, and treat concepts like a special class of things. The consequence implic-
itly is to privilege a noun. If however, we move to an emphasis on the satiric, as 
Northrop Frye has suggested through his discussions modality and as James 
Sutherland has illustrated, the adjective becomes primary (Frye 1957; Sutherland 
1962: 1–22). However odd this may sound, there is no reason why “the satiric” 
should not become a predicate variable for a wide diversity of expression. Al-
though this shifts the problem to the definition of an adjective, it does fit with 
Orgel’s notion of genre as dimension, and it also helps unravel the problem of 
what sorts of expression might come within the ambit of satire. Some writings 
certainly announce themselves as satires, but to rely on the satiric will cover 
much more material that has been associated with some notion of satire without 
pre-empting questions of form. It makes intelligible, for example, Hayden White’s 
perceptive characterization of Jacob Burckhardt’s historical vision as satiric be-
cause of his recognition of the irony of unintended consequence (White 1974: 
244–247). The adjective will also stretch beyond the discursive. There may be a 
satiric turn, a “moment” (Rosenheim 1963: 9–10) or sub-theme in many works, 
including for example philosophical treatises, songs, operas, video clips,  collages 
and the visual arts and political speeches. If we exclude these, something is 
 clearly wrong with a definition that moves to arbitrary stipulation. Emphasis on 
the satiric may help explain how family resemblances can develop, even to the 
extent that we can stop at what I’ve called a characterization rather than a 
 definition; by virtue of that, however, it also returns us to the differing priorities 
of historical, theoretical and legal discourse.
One final point: not every statement with the copula “is” pretends to be a 
definition. “It is a lovely day”, “this is a good place to finish”, and some others 
only pretend to be definitions. Bismarck’s remark that “Politics is the art of the 
possible”, or Swift’s assertion that satire is a glass in which we see all faces but 
our own, are relevant examples. Swift is not attempting to define, but ironically 
remarking on the popularity of satire by pointing to the interplay of creation and 
reception among the insufficiently reflective.
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The function of some statements maintaining definitional form with its aura 
of elegance is principally persuasive. To consider such rhetorical definitions as 
not properly definitional presupposes that definitions only have certain sorts of 
function and that there is a neat distinction between the descriptive and the nor-
mative. Such a firm distinction may be defensible. My point is only to note that to 
isolate rhetorical definitions as beyond the scope of proper definition, presup-
poses a good deal. In fact, certain rhetorical definitions (such as those above) are 
generally taken with a seriousness that overlooks their rhetorical nature). Abra-
ham Lincoln’s synoptic image of democracy as government of, for and by the 
people, had its place in a formal exercise in epideictic rhetoric, a funeral oration 
in the idiom of Pericles’ speech on the first Athenian dead in Thucydides’ Pelo-
ponnesian wars. There is something of the rhetorical to be found in books on sat-
ire that define it in terms of literature of quality and moral seriousness. We might 
well want satire to conform to our values, and definition can usefully filter what 
we don’t like (Nazi satire as really propaganda), what we consider inferior, or 
what we know little about, without the end result appearing too forced, value-
laden and almost certainly un-historical.
Given the widely-informing ethos or pretense of critique carried in words 
deemed to be satirical (whatever the content of morality, however safe or banal 
the moral posture), it is only to be expected that rhetorical definitions can them-
selves be satiric, especially when, as Sutherland does, we recognize a persuasive 
aspect to satire (Sutherland 1962: 5–7). Here we touch on the last aspect of the 
Platonic definitional legacy: for any general presumption that all definitions su-
pervene on a problematic definiendum and somehow come from outside is effec-
tively undone by the satiric definition, something intrinsic to satiric practice. 
There is, indeed, a tradition of satiric definition. Arbuthnot’s Art of political lying 
elaborates on a definition of politics as a rigid, if inventive, economy of mendac-
ity: “The Art of convincing the People of Salutary Falsehoods, for some good end”. 
(Arbuthnot 1712: 8). Thomas Sheridan provided moral and physiological defini-
tions of punning in the same idiom (Sheridan: 1719).18 Ambrose Bierce’s The 
 Devil’s Dictionary (1998 [1911]) is a far more elaborate and sustained example. 
Although owing something to earlier ad hoc satiric definition, and possibly also 
to the aphoristic style of La Rochefoucault’s Maxims (1665), Bierce’s work is 
 explicitly an ambitious parodic dictionary, and has remained a fruitful model 
for satire (see Marks et al. 2006). It provides a fitting point at which to end by 
 returning this essay to its beginning. Backhandedly it tells us something about 
18 The work was originally attributed to Swift: the men were close friends, and Thomas 
Sheridan was the grandfather of the playwright Richard Brinsley.
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dictionaries, about how to use them and to recognize their limitations: “Diction-
ary, n. A malevolent literary device for cramping the growth of a language and 
making it hard and inelastic. This dictionary, however, is a most useful work” 
(Bierce 1998).
Satire, then, much like the humor with which it has for so long been associ-
ated, is unsuitable for an essentialist definition. This is why, in “Defining parody 
and satire”, my colleagues and I offered only a “working definition”. Our argu-
ment was that such a definition ought to be helpful for lawyers dealing with con-
tentious cases of satire under new legal exemptions to Australian copyright law. 
In the light of what I have argued here, it is possible to go further and to suggest 
that anything tighter will be essentially misleading, stipulatively narrowing only 
to a certain sort of satire. For an historian, such an approach can amount to stack-
ing the evidential cards and is precisely why we should not start off by defining 
our terms. But history is not everything; and for the philosopher, historiographi-
cal characterization may be quite unsatisfactory. Do we accept the limitations of 
definition and embrace philosophy as an abstract activity at some odds with the 
seething incoherencies of experience? Or in the name of encompassing them, do 
we stop short of definition? There is not, nor should there be any easy answer.
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